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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This paper provides a broad overview of recent trends in solid waste and 
recycling, related public policy issues, and the economics literature devoted to these 
topics.  Public attention to solid waste and recycling has increased dramatically over 
the past decade both in the United States and in Europe.  In response, economists 
have developed models to help policy makers choose the efficient mix of policy 
levers to regulate solid waste and recycling activities.  Economists have also 
employed different kinds of data to estimate the factors that contribute to the 
generation of residential solid waste and recycling and to estimate the effectiveness 
of many of the policy options employed. 
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 The Economics of Residential Solid Waste Management 
 
1. Introduction 
  The market for residential solid waste management and disposal has 
experienced dramatic changes over the past 20 years.  In the early to mid 1970’s, 
most towns used local garbage dumps.  Even though recycling was well known and 
utilized by the commercial and industrial sectors of the economy, residential 
recycling was limited to spontaneous collection drives by charitable organizations for 
old newspapers and aluminum cans.  Today, 46% of Americans have access to 
municipal curbside recycling programs, many other Americans have local access to 
drop-off recycling facilities, and garbage is often transported tens, hundreds, or even 
thousands of miles for disposal in a large regional landfill.  Recycling has also 
become more popular in Europe and in other parts of the world. 
These market shifts have attracted the attention of economists who have 
devoted significant attention to understanding the causes and impacts of these events.  
Economists have also participated in discussions aimed at shaping efficient solid 
waste policy strategies.  This survey article summarizes the economic literature 
devoted to household solid waste collection and disposal.  The next section provides 
a brief historical introduction to these markets.  Section 3 surveys the theoretical 
literature devoted to suggesting the best way to regulate garbage collection and 
disposal.  Section 4 follows with a summary of solid waste policies in place, and it 
surveys the empirical studies devoted to those policies.  Since household disposal 
choices determine garbage and recycling totals, Section 5 develops a model of 
household behavior that generates hypotheses that are subsequently tested by the 
empirical economics literature. 
 
2. Recent Trends in Residential Solid Waste 
The editors of Biocycle Magazine (Glenn, 1998) began an annual survey of 
the 50 states in 1989.  Included in these surveys were state estimates of the quantity 
of solid waste landfilled, incinerated, and recycled in that state.  Figure 1 summarizes 
the total use of these three methods of waste removal over the past decade.  Although 
the percentage of household solid waste incinerated remained near 10% over the last 
decade, the percentage disposed in a landfill decreased from roughly 85% in 1989 to 
just over 60% in 1997.  This decrease was associated primarily with the simultaneous 
increase in recycling.  As illustrated in Figure 1, the United States recycled nearly 
30% of waste in 1997, up from just 10% in 1989. 
How were the states able to increase the recycling rate so dramatically over 
this time period?  The Biocycle surveys also show that the number of curbside 
collection programs in operation nationwide increased monotonically from just 1,000 
programs in 1989 to nearly 9,000 programs in 1997.  Local governments administer 
all of these programs either by collecting the material directly or by contracting with 
a single private firm.  Growth in the number of programs has steadied of late. 
 Economists have debated the extent to which the growth in curbside recycling 
can be attributed to economic factors such as increases in disposal costs or non-
economic factors.  Although this debate is explored more thoroughly below, we now 
introduce two important economic variables at play.  Figure 2 presents average 
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tipping fees in several states, and Figure 3 presents average prices of recycled 
materials in the United States over the past 10 years.  Tipping fee data were obtained 
from Biocycle’s annual survey of the 50 states (Glenn, 1998).  Rather than presenting 
the average for each state, Figure 2 illustrates the past 10 years’ nominal tipping fee 
for one state from each region of the country.  Two lessons can be drawn from this 
figure.  First, the overall trend for tipping fees is weakly positive.  But accounting for 
increases in the general price level, the real tipping fee may not have changed much 
over the past decade.  Therefore, attributing the national rise in curbside recycling to 
increases in the tipping fee is difficult to support with such casual use of data.  
However, tipping fees in the northeastern region (New Jersey) are greater than in 
other regions of the country.  And, indeed, curbside recycling programs have become 
popular in the northeast.  Perhaps, then, tipping fees have played an indirect role in 
encouraging recycling. 
The second variable of interest to economists is the price paid for recycled 
materials.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ data on the prices of corrugated 
cardboard, old newspaper waste, and scrap aluminum appear in Figure 3. Two 
lessons can also be learned from Figure 3.  First, when accounting for increases in the 
general price level, the prices of recycled materials have remained rather constant 
over the past decade (Ackerman, 1997).  Second, prices of recycled materials are 
highly variable over time.  For old newspaper, six spikes have appeared over the past 
30 years (not all are illustrated in Figure 3).  The most recent spike was in 1995 when 
the price for old newspaper (and many other materials) hit all-time highs.  This latest 
spike has been attributed to new recycled-content laws passed by several state 
governments (Ackerman, 1997).  But overall, these trends do not appear to support 
the argument that economic forces are responsible for the growth in curbside 
recycling.  This debate is conducted more systematically in economic papers 
reviewed below. 
The dramatic increase in the number of curbside recycling programs in 
operation in the United States could instead be a function of non-economic 
influences such as changes in voter tastes for the environment or purely political 
concerns.  Misinformation may have contributed to the public’s perception of a 
shortage of landfill space.  This perception may have emerged in 1987, when the 
barge "Mobro", loaded with Long Island garbage, was unable to unload its cargo 
after repeated attempts (see Bailey, 1995 for a discussion of the incident).  A wave of 
state and local legislation encouraging or mandating recycling was passed soon after 
this incident. 
Is the United States running out of landfill space?  Available landfill capacity 
is difficult to quantify, but the number of landfills in operation can be ascertained and 
reported quite easily.  Figure 4 illustrates the number of landfills (in thousands) 
operating each year in the United States over the past decade.  This number has been 
steadily decreasing by about 500 landfills each year.  Voters could have confused 
these data with a national shortage in landfill space (Bailey, 1995).  While the 
number of landfills has been steadily decreasing over the past 10 years, the estimated 
capacity of remaining landfills has been steadily rising.  Based on state-reported 
estimates (also illustrated in Figure 4), the remaining capacity of landfill space has 
doubled from roughly 10 years of remaining capacity in 1988 to 20 years in 1997. 
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 The reason for these dual trends has been the replacement of small local town 
dumps with large regional sanitary landfills.  This trend is due mostly to Subtitle D of 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976.  This law was 
designed to reduce the negative externalities associated with garbage disposal.  This 
law imposed technology-based standards on the construction, operation, and closure 
of solid waste landfills.  Landfills are now required to install thick plastic linings 
along the base, collect and treat leachate, monitor groundwater, and cover garbage 
within hours of disposal. Because the fixed costs of constructing and operating a 
landfill have increased, cost-minimizing landfill sizes increased and fewer landfills 
have been built.  The trend towards large regional landfills may also have been 
brought on by heightened public awareness over the siting of a landfill in their “back 
yard”.  Expanding an existing landfill could be politically more feasible than 
constructing a new one. 
A final general development over the past decade has been the slight increase 
and subsequent decline of incineration as a method of garbage disposal.  Figure 5 
illustrates the number of incinerators in operation in the United States over the past 
decade.  Incineration, once considered a dual solution to the solid waste and energy 
crises, reached a peak in 1991 when 170 incinerators operated nationally.  Since then, 
the number of incinerators in operation has gradually decreased.  This decline has 
been attributed to a number of factors, but most notably the quantity of garbage 
available to incinerators became lower than expected.  If fixed costs are high, then 
average costs can be reduced with an increase in garbage throughput.  But 
incinerators could not lower tipping fees to levels necessary to encourage more 
garbage without incurring financial losses.  Therefore, many local governments 
passed laws requiring all local garbage be brought to the incinerator, effectively 
giving the incinerator monopsony power over local garbage.  But the Supreme Court 
struck down these laws, exposing the incineration industry to competition from 
cheaper landfills.  The Supreme Court dealt a second blow to the incineration 
industry when it ruled that incinerator ash is toxic and must be disposed in an 
expensive toxic waste landfill.  The increased use of recycling in the early 1990’s 
further reduced the quantity of garbage available to incinerators, adding to their 
financial dilemmas.  Finally, policymakers were not eager to rescue the industry once 
the public began to oppose the resulting air pollution emitted by incinerators.   
Where land is scarce, however, incineration has become a more viable option.  
The northeastern portion of the United States incinerates 40% of its waste.  
Incineration is also popular in Japan and several European countries where 
population densities are large and land values are high.  Table 1 indicates the 
percentage of waste that is landfilled in several European countries in the middle 
1980’s (the remaining portion is incinerated).  Greece, Ireland, and the U.K. rely 
almost exclusively on landfills.  But Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark rely on 
incineration to manage the bulk of their garbage.  Facing less competition from land-
intensive landfills, incinerators in these countries as well as in the Northeast region 
of the United States can capture the economies of scale necessary to keep the average 
costs of incineration down (Halstead and Park, 1996).  But even though many 
countries rely heavily on incineration, Brisson (1997) finds the private and full 
external costs of incineration exceed those associated with landfill disposal in most 
European countries.   
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3. The Optimal Policy in the Theoretical Literature 
This section reviews the economic literature devoted to designing solid waste 
management policies to achieve the efficient quantity of garbage and recycling.  A 
skeletal model is developed here to frame discussion of optimal policy design.  
Notation developed for this model will be used throughout this review. 
Assume that  N  identical households each maximizes utility that is defined 
over consumption (c).  Consumption produces waste that must either be disposed as 
garbage for collection at the curb (g) or recycled (r).  We use  c = c(g, r) to represent 
the various combinations of  g  and  r  that are consistent with any particular level of 
consumption.  Given prices paid for consumption (pc), and garbage collection (pg), 
and received for recycled materials (pr), the household with income (y) will make 
disposal decisions to maximize utility (u), 
 
    u = u(c) = u[c(g, r)] 
 
subject to the budget constraint, 
 
    y = pcc(g, r) + pgg - prr. 
 
Producers in the model choose virgin (v) and recycled (r) inputs to produce  c  
according to the production function  c = f(v, r).  Given input prices  pr  and  pv (for 
recycled and virgin materials, respectively), the producer chooses inputs to maximize 
profit, 
 
    π = pcf(v, r) - pvv - prr. 
 
Firms in this model would employ virgin and recycled materials so that the 
ratio of input prices equals the ratio of marginal products.  Households would choose 
between garbage and recycling in a similar manner.  In fact, it is easy to show that 
since agents in this simple model internalize all of the costs and benefits of their 
choices, resources are allocated efficiently and the optimal quantities of garbage and 
recycling are produced.  But the total amount of solid waste disposed (G = Ng) could 
emit foul odor, pollute groundwater, create an eyesore, or contribute to climate 
change.1  Household utility could be impacted by these effects, so assume now that  u 
= u(c, G), where  uG < 0.  Under this assumption, households fail to internalize the 
full social costs of their disposal decisions.  Too much garbage and too little 
recycling is produced by a decentralized economy. 
In order to internalize disposal costs, economists have suggested several tax 
and subsidy schemes.  This section will review the economic literature devoted to 
designing the tax/subsidy policy that can achieve the efficient allocation of resources 
in the presence of external costs from garbage disposal.  Households could be taxed 
on each unit of garbage disposed (at rate  tg) or subsidized for their recycling effort 
                                                 
1
 An estimated 6% of the world’s emissions of methane (a greenhouse gas) are 
released from landfills (Beede and Bloom, 1995). 
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(at rate shr).  Households could also be required to pay an advanced disposal fee at the 
time of purchase (tc). Under these policy schemes, households maximizes utility, 
 
    u = u[c(g, r), G] 
 
subject to the amended budget constraint, 
 
   y = (pc+tc)c(g, r) + (pg+tg)g - (pr+shr)r. 
 
The producer’s use of virgin material could be taxed (tv), or use of recycled materials 
could be subsidized (sfr), resulting in the profit function, 
 
   π = pcf(v, r) - (pv+tv)v - (pr-sfr)r. 
 
Economic research reviewed below has found that various combinations of 
these policies (tc, tg, shr, sfr, tv) can encourage a decentralized economy to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources.  Command and control policies such as mandatory 
household recycling ordinances and minimum recycled-content standards on 
producers can also achieve efficient outcomes in theory.  But economists rarely 
support such forms of policy because the information required to achieve efficient 
outcomes is not likely to be available to policymakers.  The literature devoted to the 
study of command and control policies is not rich. 
The most direct approach to internalizing the external costs of garbage 
disposal is to tax each bag of garbage presented by the household (tg).  Most 
households have traditionally either paid for garbage removal with a flat monthly or 
quarterly fee, or through local property or income taxes.  Households that contribute 
large quantities of garbage therefore pay the same as a household that contributes 
smaller quantities, so the cost per bag (pg+tg) is zero, even though the social marginal 
cost of that extra bag is greater than zero.  The implementation of a tax (also called a 
user fee) on each bag of garbage can require households to internalize the social 
marginal collection and disposal costs. 
Using a panel of twelve cities with direct pricing, Jenkins (1993) estimates 
that pricing garbage according to its social marginal cost would reduce the quantity 
of garbage produced by households and therefore improve social welfare by as much 
as $650 million per year, roughly $3 per person per year.  Fullerton and Kinnaman 
(1996) use household data and also estimate the potential benefits of marginal cost 
pricing to be in the neighborhood of $3 per person per year.  Podolsky and Spiegel 
(1998) study a cross-section of towns in New Jersey and estimate the economic 
benefits of charging per unit of garbage to be as great as $12.80 per person per year. 
 One particular advantage of taxing garbage directly (employing a user fee) is 
that other tax instruments discussed above are unnecessary for achieving the efficient 
allocation of resources (Fullerton and Kinnaman, 1995, and Palmer and Walls, 
1994).  Households may recycle, compost, or engage in source-reduction according 
to the private costs they face. As long as households face the full social cost of their 
disposal decisions, they will make those decisions efficiently.  Any increase in 
recycling can reduce the price of recycled materials, making these materials more 
attractive to manufacturers without a direct tax on virgin materials or subsidy to 
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recycling.  In fact, Dinan (1993) finds that a tax on virgin materials (tv) in 
combination with a user fee would not be efficient, since the same material is 
effectively taxed twice.  Another advantage of taxing garbage directly is that the only 
information needed by the local policy maker is the full social cost of each bag of 
garbage.  Repetto et al. (1992) estimate this cost to be $1.43-$1.83 per bag, 
depending on local private and social disposal costs.2  Finally, Fullerton and Wu 
(1998) show that pricing garbage according to its social marginal costs can also 
encourage firms to produce the optimal amount of packaging per unit and to engage 
in the optimal amount of green design.3 
 Perhaps in response to these arguments, an estimated 4000 communities in 
the United States have started to price garbage directly (Miranda and Bynum, 1999).  
These programs levy a fee on each bag of garbage collected from each household.  
Garbage collectors can exclude non-payers by utilizing some method of identifying 
who has paid, such as requiring households to purchase specially marked bags, tags, 
or stickers. 
Several arguments against the use of direct marginal cost pricing of garbage 
have also appeared in the economics literature.  First, taxing garbage may be 
problematic if illicit or illegal dumping on the part of households is encouraged.4  
Second, the administrative costs of implementing the program may exceed the social 
benefits estimated above.  Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) estimate that the 
administrative costs of printing, distributing, and accounting for garbage stickers in 
Charlottesville, Virginia could exceed the $3 per person per year benefits mentioned 
above.  Third, a uniform tax on all types of garbage may be inefficient if materials 
within the waste stream produce different social costs (Dinan, 1993).  If, for 
example, the social cost of disposing flashlight batteries is greater than that of old 
newspapers, then the disposal tax on flashlight batteries should exceed that on old 
newspapers.  But such a precise tax scheme is costly to administer. 
To respond to these problems, Dobbs (1991) and Fullerton and Kinnaman 
(1995) develop models that suggest that if households have the option to litter or 
dump their garbage, and if the external costs of littered garbage exceeds that of 
                                                 
2
 This estimate is comprised of private and external collection and disposal costs 
(including a depletion allowance).  The external costs are based somewhat on the 
work of Stone and Ashford (1991) and the Tellus Institute (1991). 
3
 Kennedy and Laplante (1994) also develop a model that suggests garbage should be 
priced at its social marginal cost.  But, if governments must balance the disposal 
portion of their budget (and lump sum taxes are not available), then the optimal 
policy may change.  In particular, if the social marginal cost of waste disposal is 
greater than the household’s marginal cost of dumping, then the user fee should be 
set just equal to the household’s private marginal cost of dumping, and the subsidy 
for recycling should be lowered. 
4
 Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) estimate that 28% of the reduction in garbage 
resulting from pricing garbage at the curb may have been dumped.  Jenkins (1993), 
Blume (1991), and Miranda and Aldy (1998) also find evidence of increased 
dumping.  A number of other studies find minimal changes in dumping, including 
Podolsky and Spiegel (1998), Strathman et al. (1995), Miranda et al. (1994), Miranda 
and Bauer (1996), and Nestor and Podolsky (1998). 
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legally-disposed garbage, then the optimal tax on legal garbage disposal (tg) could be 
negative.  That is, legal garbage disposal should be subsidized.  In fact, if the 
administrative costs of levying a tax on each bag of garbage are significant, then the 
optimal policy may involve subsidizing garbage at its full price (set pg+tg=0).  
Policymakers can instead implement other policies defined below to achieve efficient 
disposal choices. 
 If taxing or even pricing garbage directly is problematic, economists have 
studied whether the implementation of a tax on virgin materials (tv) can achieve the 
efficient allocation of resources in a world where garbage disposal produces external 
costs.  Such a tax could increase producer’s demand for recycled inputs, drive up the 
price paid for recycled materials, and thus increase the economic benefits to 
households that deliver recyclable materials to secondary markets.  Miedema (1983) 
finds that a tax on virgin materials (tv) set equal to the social marginal cost of 
disposing any resulting waste material produces welfare gains greater than would 
result from a subsidy on producer’s use of recycled materials (sfr), a direct tax on 
household solid waste (tg), or an advanced disposal fee (tc).  The main advantage of 
virgin materials tax is that it both discourages the economy’s use of virgin materials 
(resulting in less subsequent solid waste) and encourages the development of the 
market for recycled materials. 
 Others studies have questioned the use of a tax on virgin materials.  Dinan 
(1993) finds that although a tax on virgin materials encourages the use of recycled 
materials in industries where the recycled input is a substitute for the taxed virgin 
input, other industries that do not use the taxed virgin input will not increase demand 
for recycled materials.  For example, farmers could use old newspapers for animal 
bedding, but a tax on paper manufacturer’s use of virgin wood pulp will not 
encourage this form of recycling.  Dinan (1993) also suggests that a domestic tax on 
virgin materials does not encourage exporters to purchase recycled materials.  
Significant portions of recyclable paper are currently exported. 
Palmer and Walls (1994) develop a model that suggests that although a tax on 
virgin materials can encourage the efficient mix of inputs, it can discourage 
production and consumption in the overall economy.  The result is an inefficiently 
low quantity of garbage.  Therefore, the virgin materials tax is only efficient when 
combined with a subsidy on the sales of final goods.  Only for the special case where 
the marginal product of recycled materials is exactly one (1) can a tax on virgin 
materials lead to the efficient input mix and output level.  Finally, both Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1995) and Walls and Palmer (1997) find that as long as other policy 
options are available (namely a deposit/refund system discussed below), then a tax on 
virgin materials is only necessary to correct for any external costs associated with 
cutting or extracting the virgin material.  The tax is not needed to correct for the 
external costs associated with garbage disposal. 
 Palmer and Walls (1994) find that a recycling subsidy (shr or sfr) by itself can 
indeed provide the efficient input mix (between virgin and recycled inputs), but it 
leads to excess production, consumption and waste.  Therefore, the subsidy to 
recycling must be combined with a tax on consumption (tc).  But the implementation 
of an advanced disposal fee (tc) by itself only encourages source reduction, not 
recycling.  Only the combination of an advanced disposal fee and a subsidy to 
recycling encourages both source reduction at the time of production and recycling at 
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the time of disposal (Palmer et al., 1997).  This policy is essentially a deposit/refund 
system.5 
Several economic studies have favored the use of deposit-refund systems to 
correct for the external costs associated with garbage disposal, including Dinan 
(1993), Dobbs (1991), Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995), Palmer and Walls (1994), 
Palmer et al. (1997), Fullerton and Wu (1998), and Atri and Schellberg (1995).  To 
achieve the efficient allocation, the deposit is set equal to the social marginal cost of 
disposing the resulting material, and the optimal refund is set equal to the difference 
between the marginal external cost of garbage and the marginal external cost of 
recycling.  If the external costs of recycling are zero, then the refund matches the 
deposit.  The deposit could be levied either on the production or the sale of goods.  
As long as transaction costs are low, the refund can be given either to the households 
that recycle the materials or to the producers that use the recycled materials in 
production.  If the refund is given to the households, then the supply increase will 
drive down the price of recycled materials to firms.  If the refund is given to firms, 
firms will increase demand for recycled materials and drive up the price received by 
households (Atri and Schellberg, 1995).  In addition, Fullerton and Wu (1998) find 
that the refund given under a deposit/refund system will encourage firms optimally to 
engineer products that are easier to recycle. Households will demand such products 
in order to recycle and receive the refund.  This result is important since directly 
encouraging the recyclability of product design can be administratively difficult. 
Economists have also discussed some implementation issues related to a 
deposit/refund system.  Palmer and Walls (1994) argue that a deposit/refund system 
would be easier to implement than a tax on virgin materials with a subsidy to 
consumption (an alternative policy combination that could also achieve the efficient 
outcome).  Firms could organize a strong defense against the implementation of a tax 
on virgin materials.  Households may lack this political organization.  Furthermore, 
the subsidy to recycling may earn the support of households with strong tastes for the 
environment.  Also, less information is necessary to implement the deposit/refund 
system efficiently.  The policy maker only needs to know the marginal social cost of 
waste disposal.  The optimal deposit and refund need only be set equal to this value.  
The application of a virgin materials tax on the other hand requires information on 
each firm’s technical rate of substitution between recycled and virgin inputs.  This 
type of information is normally not available to the policy maker (Palmer and Walls, 
1994).  If the administrative costs associated with operating the deposit/refund 
programs are high, then Dinan (1993) suggests that policymakers could single out 
products that comprise a large segment of the waste stream (newspaper) or that 
involve very high social marginal disposal costs (batteries).  Palmer and Walls 
                                                 
5
 Palmer et al. (1997) find that a 10% reduction in solid waste can be achieved with a 
$45/ton deposit/refund system, an $85/ton advanced disposal fee by itself or a 
$98/ton recycling subsidy by itself.  The latter amounts are larger because these 
policies must “work harder” to achieve the reduction in garbage since they do not 
encourage both source reduction at time of production and recycling at the time of 
disposal.  For example, Starreveld and Van Ierland (1994) estimate that using only a 
disposal fee of $.30 per kilogram (roughly $272 per ton) of plastic will result in the 
recycling of 25% of disposed plastic in the Netherlands. 
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(1999) argue that a tax on produced intermediate goods combined with a subsidy 
paid to collectors of recycling would preserve the efficiency effects of a deposit-
refund system but would be less costly to administer. 
One “command and control” policy to receive the attention of environmental 
economists is a recycled content standard; a law requiring firms to employ a 
minimum portion of recycled materials in their products.  Several states have passed 
such a law.  Palmer and Walls (1997) point out the problems associated with a 
recycled content standard.  First, recycled content standards can only achieve 
efficiency if carefully implemented with other policies.  If recyclable materials are 
highly productive at the margin, but are not used because of their high price, then a 
recycled-content standard could increase production and therefore solid waste.  A tax 
on consumption is also necessary.  If recycled materials are unproductive on the 
margin, standards will decrease output (and solid waste) and will therefore require a 
subsidy to consumption to achieve efficiency.  Their model also requires a tax on 
labor (the other input to production).  Finally, the efficient implementation of a 
recycled-content standard requires information not ordinarily available to policy 
makers. 
This section provided an overview of the economic literature on the best 
policy approaches to respond to the external costs of traditional garbage disposal.  
Although a direct tax on garbage disposal (tg) and a tax on virgin materials (tv) have 
been supported by some, the combination of an advanced disposal fee (tc) and a 
subsidy to recycling (sfr or shr) is supported by the majority of studies.  The next 
section provides a survey of the current set of policies implemented by local, state, 
and the federal governments in the United States and across the world, and it 
discusses empirical lessons from the vast array of policies currently in place. 
 
4. Solid Waste Policies - A Summary of Empirical Studies 
 This section provides a broad review of the various solid waste management 
policies implemented in the United States and abroad.  The reader will quickly see 
that actual approaches used by policymakers often differ from the theoretical policy 
prescriptions detailed in the last section.  The results of empirical economic papers 
related to each policy are discussed where available. 
 
A. Policy Directives in the United States 
 
1. Federal Government 
 The most influential disposal regulation passed by the Federal Government of 
the United States was the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 
1976.  Subtitle D of RCRA imposed technology-based standards on the construction, 
operation, and closure of solid waste landfills.  Prior to RCRA, most every town in 
the United States had a local dump.  These dumps were often formed near the edge 
of town, perhaps on a flood plain near a river. 
 Today’s regulated landfills are constructed with a base of several inches of 
various grades of plastic lining to prevent leachate from seeping. Underground 
plumbing systems capture and treat leachate, and local groundwater supplies are 
continuously monitored.  In terms of operation, garbage must be covered with soil 
within hours of disposal to reduce foul odor, discourage pests, and reduce the risk of 
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health hazards.  Many landfills capture and burn methane to produce electricity.  
Access roads must be watered several times each day to prevent dust from heavy 
truck traffic from rising.  These regulations have decreased substantially the external 
costs associated with garbage disposal, but have also increased average disposal costs 
from an estimated $9 per ton to $20 per ton (Beede and Bloom, 1995). 
 Even with the recent advances in the technology of landfill construction and 
operation, local environmental activist groups still often oppose the creation or 
expansion of landfills in their region.  Landfills depress property values.  Housing 
values have been estimated to rise by 6.2% for each mile (up to two miles) away 
from a landfill (Nelson et al., 1992, as cited in Beede and Bloom, 1995).  Roberts et 
al. (1991) interviewed 150 households in Tennessee and estimated households were 
willing to pay $227 per year to avoid having a landfill nearby.  Reported amounts 
increase with income, education, and dependency on well water for water 
consumption. 
 A second Federal Government initiative that has influenced the market for the 
collection and disposal of household solid waste is the subsidy of virgin material 
extraction in the United States.  First, income earned by the timber industry has been 
taxed at the capital gains rate instead of the corporate income tax rate.  Second, the 
depletion of minerals extracted can be deducted from earned income as a form of 
depreciation.  Third, mineral exploration has traditionally been encouraged on public 
lands.  Fourth, freight rates charged for recycled materials have often been higher 
than for their virgin counterparts.  These various forms of favorable tax treatments 
may have, on the margin, encouraged firms to utilize virgin inputs over recycled 
inputs, perhaps resulting in the current underdevelopment of the market for recycled 
materials. 
Through a variety of papers, economists have learned a great deal about the 
market for recyclable materials.  For example, Nestor (1992) reports that firms that 
could purchase recyclable materials are often capital intensive.  Most of the existing 
capital stock is suitable for the use of virgin material in production.  Re-tooling these 
industries to accept recycled inputs could be expensive.  She also estimates the paper 
industry’s price elasticity of demand for old newspapers.  The short-run price 
elasticity of demand is estimated at only –0.0475.  This elasticity increases to -0.0732 
(1 year), -0.1009 (3 years), -0.1128 (5 years), and to –0.1216 in the “long run”.  
These estimates are inelastic because the newsprint industry in many countries is 
equipped for the use of virgin fiber.  The short-run marginal cost to the firm of using 
substitute inputs is high.  The implication of an inelastic demand is that policies 
aimed at increasing the supply of old newspapers could indeed reduce their price but 
will not effectively increase the quantity of newspapers recycled.  Furthermore, the 
elimination of existing tax subsidies on virgin inputs in the United States, Nestor 
(1992) reports, will also have little impact on the quantity of old newspapers 
recycled.  The more effective approach would involve subsidizing the firm’s 
purchases of capital equipment that would allow for the substitute use of both virgin 
and recycled inputs. 
 Anderson and Spiegelman (1977) also find the price elasticity of demand for 
scrap steel and old newspaper to be inelastic (-0.64 and –0.08, respectively).  The 
elimination of tax advantages for virgin inputs is estimated to increase newspaper 
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recycling by only 0.04% and scrap steel recycling by only 0.37%.6  Anderson and 
Spiegelman (1977) also forecast that a subsidy to the suppliers of scrap iron (a 15% 
depletion deduction) would decrease the price of scrap steel by 7.2% and increase its 
quantity demanded by 2.9%.  A similar subsidy to wastepaper suppliers (of 18%) 
would decrease the price of old newspapers by 8.6% but increase the quantity 
recycled by only 0.57%.  A $10 per ton subsidy to the purchasers of old newspaper is 
forecasted to increase the quantity of newspaper recycled by only 2.0%.  The 
common theme found throughout these empirical studies is the relative 
unresponsiveness of quantity demanded for recycled inputs to its price.  Policies 
designed to increase the supply of recycled materials may have little impact on the 
quantity of recycled materials used in production. 
 One explanation given for the resistance on the part of many firms to make 
capital improvements to allow for the use of recycled materials has been the 
uncertainty over obtaining a steady supply of recycled materials.  Prior to the 
widespread use of municipal recycling programs, the market’s supply of recycled 
materials was highly variable.  To determine whether tax or subsidy policies could 
stimulate the supply of recycled materials, several economists have estimated the 
effect of price on the quantity supplied.  Most of these studies found the supply of 
recycled materials also to be inelastic.  For example, Bingham et al. (1983) estimate 
the price elasticity of supply of glass (0.165), steel (0.372), and aluminum (0.730).  
Miedema (1976 - cited in Edwards and Pearce, 1978) also finds the price elasticity of 
supply of wastepaper to be inelastic (0.09).  Ir Vander Kuil (1976 - cited in Edwards 
and Pearce, 1978) finds evidence that increases in the price of recycled materials 
simply shifts the source of the supplied materials from municipalities to volunteer 
scout groups.7  But now that municipal governments supply the industry with a 
steady and predictable stream of recycled materials, firms may find the environment 
more conducive to invest in capital equipment suitable for recycled inputs. 
 
2. State Governments 
 RCRA also assigned to the states the responsibility of regulating the market 
for household solid waste collection and recycling.  The logic behind this action was 
based on the inherent differences in industry practices and environmental conditions 
across the states (Callan and Thomas, 1997).  Delegating disposal authority to the 
states has resulted in a wide variety of policy approaches.  Table 2 provides a glance 
at the policies enacted by each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia to 
increase recycling.  The most common state action is to set a goal for recycling as a 
                                                 
6
 If, in the long run, virgin and recycled inputs are perfect substitutes, then the 
elimination of tax advantages for virgin input would still only increase newspaper 
recycling by 1.68% and scrap steel by 3.4%. 
7
 Many of these empirical studies also uncover a negative relationship between a 
previous period’s prices and current supply quantities.  This relationship is explained 
by the use of stockpiling.  If prices of recycled materials were low in a previous 
period, then firms may build up their inventories rather than sell at the low price.  An 
increased inventory then increases supply in the current period.  The assumption that 
suppliers stockpile materials to wait for higher prices has not been tested by the 
economics literature. 
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percentage of the solid waste stream.  These goals range from 20% in Maryland to 
70% in Rhode Island.  The laws are ceremonious, for the most part, since they rarely 
state the consequences of falling short.  In fact, the strategy employed by many states 
facing a failure to achieve the goal is to delay the deadline.  Kinnaman and Fullerton 
(1997) find no significant impact of these goals on recycling quantities. 
States have also passed laws that set recycling guidelines for municipalities 
within the state.  The strongest law requires all municipalities to implement curbside 
recycling programs and to pass local ordinances making household participation in 
the recycling program mandatory.  Seven states, including Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey, have passed such laws.  Seven other states have passed similar laws requiring 
municipalities to offer recycling programs to households, but do not require the 
implementation of mandatory ordinances.  Finally, eight states have set recycling 
goals for each town or county to satisfy, but allow each town or county to decide how 
to go about achieving the goal. 
In exchange for these various mandates, 34 states provide grants to localities 
to help finance the costs of recycling expenses.  For example, in Pennsylvania, each 
municipality receives a state grant that is based on the total quantity of materials 
recycled.  Although economists have not devoted attention to estimating the 
incidence of these various forms of state recycling mandates, anecdotal evidence 
indicates the laws are costly but have had a dramatic impact on the number of 
municipal recycling programs operating within these states. 
An approach taken by 23 states to regulate household solid waste is to 
prevent yard waste from being disposed in landfills.  Large composting facilities are 
usually established to accommodate yard waste more cheaply than disposal in 
landfills.  Several other states have passed laws preventing materials such as 
automobile tires, batteries, motor oil and old appliances from entering landfills (not 
presented in Table 2).  In one highly publicized example, the state of Maine banned 
the disposal of aseptic packaging (drink boxes) in landfills.  The ban was repealed 
after a Tellus Institute study found them to be environmentally friendly relative to 
other drink containers (Ackerman, 1997). 
The oldest policy implemented at the state level is deposit-refund systems for 
empty beverage containers.  The state of Oregon was the first to pass this form of 
legislation in 1983.  Eight other states have followed suit, though no state has 
implemented a new deposit-refund system since the early 1980’s. 
 States quickly learned that their policies aimed at stimulating the supply of 
recyclable materials produced a glut of recycled materials (see a review of economic 
research on this topic above).  To help balance the market, states began to implement 
policies designed to stimulate the demand for recycled materials.  Twenty-nine states 
provide tax credits to encourage the production of new recycling plants, fifteen states 
provide low-interest loans for the same, and 29 states require government offices and 
in some cases private firms to purchase a minimum of their inputs from recycled 
products.  As mentioned above, Palmer and Walls (1997) find recycled-content 
standards to be a difficult policy to implement and administer. 
A final area of state intervention involves the use of restrictions on shipments 
of solid waste imported from other states.  The transition from local dumps to 
regional landfills also brought an increase in the amount of solid waste transported 
across state and national boundaries.  Today, an estimated 8% of all waste generated 
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in the United States is disposed in another state.  A few states, especially 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and those in the Midwest, have recently attempted to restrict 
the quantity of solid waste imported.  Repeated attempts by these states to restrict the 
importation of garbage were struck down by the Supreme Court, which ruled that 
import restrictions violate the free flow of interstate commerce.8  More recently, 
several governors have petitioned Congress to pass Federal legislation imposing 
import restrictions on interstate garbage shipments.  Congress has yet to pass such 
legislation. 
The top importer of solid waste in the United States is Pennsylvania, followed 
by Ohio, Virginia, Illinois and Indiana.  In 1996, Pennsylvania received its waste 
from New York (3,300,000 tons), New Jersey (3,100,000 tons), Maryland (819,000 
tons), Delaware (261,000 tons) and Connecticut (141,000 tons).  Overall garbage 
imports to Pennsylvania have increased from 3.8 million tons in 1993 to 7.9 million 
tons in 1996. Similar growth rates have emerged in other importing states. 
One reason state governments are frustrated with imported garbage is that 
their states have devoted significant public resources to reducing the quantity of solid 
waste generated within the state.  As discussed above, resources have been devoted 
to implementing curbside recycling programs, banning certain materials from being 
disposed in landfills, providing tax advantages and/or subsidized loans to 
commercial recycling activities, and distributing grants to help run local recycling 
services.  State officials may wonder what the state has gained by these efforts if the 
saved landfill space is filled by imports from other states.  For example, in 1996 the 
state of Pennsylvania recycled 1.9 million tons of solid waste, but imported 7.9 
million tons. 
Traditional economic theory suggests free trading of garbage is efficient since 
those states with a comparative advantage in garbage disposal can specialize in 
garbage disposal.  Any policy that interferes with the free flow of garbage would 
therefore be socially costly.  Ley et al. (1997) estimate the loss in total surplus 
resulting from various restrictions on the flow of garbage considered by Congress.  
First, a $1 per ton surcharge on imported garbage would result in a 4% decrease in 
the quantity of garbage traded and a loss of total surplus of only $0.02 per person.  
The implementation of caps on the quantity of garbage traded across state lines (caps 
consistent with a Senate bill passed in 1995 that would require a reduction in garbage 
imports to 65% of their 1993 levels after a prolonged introductory phase) results in a 
surplus loss of $10 per person.  Finally, a law that restricted all trading of garbage 
would result in a $18 per person loss in surplus.  This study assumes that all external 
costs associated with garbage disposal are internalized through the tipping fee. 
Other economic arguments can be made that flow controls improve welfare.  
Copeland (1991) provides two arguments in favor of restrictions of garbage imports.  
First, governments in some states (or countries) may not adequately regulate the 
industry to ensure that the external costs of garbage disposal are internalized.  Total 
welfare can improve if exports from a highly-regulated country are prevented from 
                                                 
8
 As an exception, U.S. courts have often applied the Market Participant doctrine that 
allows local governments to restrict out-of-state garbage from government-owned 
disposal sites.  See Podolsky and Spiegel (1999) for a thorough review of the case 
law related to interstate garbage shipments. 
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entering a weakly- regulated country.  Since landfill regulations across the United 
States are uniform, this rationale is probably more appropriate to inter-country 
shipments of solid waste.  Second, even if regulations are uniform across trading 
partners, Copeland argues that restricting garbage trade can still improve welfare if 
evading the regulations is easier in one area than another.  Also, Macauley at al. 
(1993) explain that allowing landfills the option to practice third-degree price 
discrimination (for example, charging a greater fee on imported garbage relative to 
local garbage) can be welfare improving if these landfills operate in imperfectly 
competitive markets.  A landfill that can lower prices to local customers (with 
relatively elastic demand curves for garbage disposal) without having to lower prices 
to importers (with more inelastic demand curves) can make the local landfill and 
local residents better off without making the rest of the world worse off.9 
Interestingly, while many state governments have attempted to restrict out-of-
state garbage, other local governments have attempted to prevent local garbage from 
being exported from the area.  As discussed above, such restrictions on garbage flow 
were designed to help support local incinerators that levy tipping fees that often 
exceed those of neighboring landfills.  The Supreme Court recently struck down the 
use of such export restrictions.  Tawil (1999) estimated that this event did not impact 
the profit levels of the participating incinerators or waste-hauling firms.  Perhaps 
entry into the waste management industry is easy, eroding any profits that could have 
followed the Supreme Court’s ruling.  Finally, Podolsky and Spiegel (1999) argue 
that the existence of economies of scale in garbage disposal practices could in some 
cases merit restrictions on garbage exports.  The local reduction in average disposal 
costs attributed to the increase in garbage brought on by the export restriction could 
exceed the increase in average disposal costs experienced by a distant site. 
Public and academic attention devoted to the issue of flow controls may 
increase when the Fresh Kills Landfill on Staten Island closes in 2002.  New York 
City currently disposes 13,000 tons per day (4.7 million tons per year) in the Fresh 
Kills Landfill, the largest landfill in the country.  Given the recent 38% cut in New 
York City’s recycling budget, all signs indicate that New York City’s garbage will be 
exported to other states. 
 
3. Local Governments 
Markets for household solid waste collection and disposal were once 
decentralized.  As cities began to develop, dumps often formed near the outskirts of 
each town, and households were typically responsible for transporting their own 
waste to this dump.  To ensure that all garbage was removed from neighborhoods, 
and to help capture economies of density, many communities designating a single 
collector for household solid waste. 
In the United States, this intervention has typically taken one of two forms.  
First, direct government provision meant that municipalities would purchase trucks, 
hire drivers, and define collection routes.  The costs of this local service was 
typically financed out of general tax revenue or the issuing of monthly or quarterly 
bills to each household.  Second, the local government could regulate a single private 
                                                 
9
 This conclusion is an application of more general findings related to the efficiency 
of Ramsey pricing. 
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collector.  The town could contract with a single firm to collect all garbage or it 
could award a franchise permission to collect garbage to a single private garbage 
collector.  The main difference between these two latter forms is that under a 
franchise agreement the private collector bills the households rather than the town. 
Town governments could also pass local ordinances requiring households to 
hire their own company.  Although such competitive garbage systems still operate 
today, the single collector model is the norm.  Dubin and Navarro (1988) estimate 
that 43% of communities in the United States rely upon contract or franchise 
agreements, 26% of municipalities operate municipal collection programs, and 30% 
rely on the competitive market.10 
Economies of density suggest that a single collector could reduce the overall 
collection costs.  Dubin and Navarro (1988) find that an increase in the population 
density by 100 persons per square mile decreases the average cost per ton of 
collected materials by $1.62.  Kemper and Quigly (1976) estimate that competitive 
markets are 25% to 36% more expensive than a single collector, and that contract or 
franchise agreements reduce costs over municipal collections by another 13 to 30% 
(depending on the level of service).  Stevens (1978) estimates that the contract or 
franchise agreements are 26% to 48% cheaper than a competitive private market and 
27 to 37% cheaper than municipal provision (for cities over 50,000 population).  
Savas (1977) finds that municipal collection is 14% more costly than that by a single 
private firm.  Bohm et al (1999) estimates that municipally-run curbside recycling 
programs are on average $82,000 more costly per year than private recycling 
programs.  Finally, McDavid (1985) finds in Canada that public collection is 41% 
more costly than private collection.  This difference is identified (by McDavid) to 
arise from the fact that workers in private firms receive productivity bonuses and 
private collectors are more likely to use larger trucks with smaller crew sizes. 
Why don’t all communities employ the most efficient contract or franchise 
method?  Dubin and Navarro (1988) find that the community’s choice of method 
depends upon the power of rent-seeking interest groups (such as labor unions) and 
the ideological preferences of the community.  Conservative towns are more likely to 
rely on the free market than liberal towns, but liberal towns are more likely to use 
municipal collection rather than contract or franchise agreements. 
 Beyond the mere collection of household garbage, local governments have 
also attempted to influence the decisions of households to reduce the quantity of 
garbage collected and disposed.  Drop-off and curbside recycling programs, unit-
based pricing programs, and mandatory recycling ordinances have been passed.  
Although precise year-to-year data are unavailable, recent estimates indicate that over 
9000 curbside recycling programs and 4000 unit-based pricing programs are 
currently in operation in the United States.  Economic studies of the impact of these 
policies are summarized in Section 5 below. 
 At first, towns began to offer drop-off recycling services.  Towns would 
usually purchase (or rent) a few large trailers, and would leave those trailers on 
                                                 
10
 In Canada, McDavid (1985) estimates that only 20.6% of cities with populations in 
excess of 10,000 use municipal collection, though another 37.3% rely partly on the 
municipality to collect household garbage at the curb and partly on private firms to 
compete for collection from commercial establishments and apartment buildings. 
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municipal property, usually a parking lot or near the entrance of a park or other 
municipal property.  Residents would voluntarily transport certain materials (usually 
newspaper, aluminum cans, and perhaps glass).  Jakus et al. (1996) estimate that 
rural households devote an average of 90 seconds to recycle one unit of glass and one 
unit of old newspaper.  Given the opportunity cost of household time, households 
paid $1.29 to recycle one pound of each material.  Based on quantities recycled, 
Jakus et al. (1996) estimate that these households value local access to drop-off 
facilities at $5.78 per month. 
 As municipal governments gained expertise in the area of marketing recycled 
products, they began to implement curbside recycling programs.  Curbside recycling 
programs decrease the household’s time and effort devoted to recycling.  Households 
are expected to respond by recycling more, while municipal governments collect 
more, save disposal costs, and earn greater revenues from the sale of materials.  The 
external costs of garbage collection and disposal could also decrease.  Powell et al. 
(1996) find that the costs associated with vehicle emissions, traffic accidents, and 
road congestion are much less for curbside programs (4.99 British pounds sterling 
per ton recycled) than for drop-off programs (22.95 British pounds sterling per ton 
recycled).  Direct estimates of the impact of the implementation of curbside recycling 
programs on household disposal choices are presented in Section 5 below, where the 
disposal choices of the household are carefully modeled. 
 Are economic or non-economic forces responsible for the recent increase in 
the number of municipal curbside recycling programs?  The answer is probably both.  
Tawil (1995) and Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) estimate the probability of 
implementing a curbside recycling program.  Tawil (1995) employs a cross-sectional 
database of 80 towns in Massachusetts to estimate that every $1000 that can be saved 
by curbside recycling increases the probability of adoption by 11%.  But Tawil 
(1995) also finds that a 1% increase in the percentage of households belonging to an 
environmental interest group increases the probability of adoption by 4%.  Kinnaman 
and Fullerton (1997) also uncover economic reasons for implementing a recycling 
program.  The likelihood increases by .78% with a $1 increase in the tipping fee 
(from the average tipping fee of $26) and by .39% with a 100-person increase per 
square mile (from the average density of 2,600) since average collection costs could 
decrease with the population density (Bohm et al, 1999).  However, non-economic 
variables also partly explain the move towards recycling.  A one-percent increase in 
the percentage of the population with a college degree (from the average of 23.6%) 
increases the likelihood that a town implements curbside recycling by 0.77%. 
Several economic studies have estimated directly the benefits and costs of 
curbside recycling programs.  Most suggest that the costs of operating a curbside 
program exceed the benefits resulting from the subsequent decrease in garbage 
disposal costs and sale of collected materials.  Franklin Associates (1994) use 
national cost averages to estimate that recycling costs the municipality $9.52 to 
$16.53 per ton more than the cost of landfill disposal.  Other studies suggest 
recycling is much more costly.  The Solid Waste Association of North America 
(SWANA, 1995) estimates it costs an extra $74 per ton to recycle in a sample of 6 
communities.  Kinnaman (1998) estimates that a recycling program costs an extra 
$55.45 per ton recycled.  This estimate includes costs to firms that are required by 
local ordinance to recycle.  Carroll (1997) uses cross-section data from Wisconsin to 
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estimate that recycling costs over $140 per ton, roughly $100 more than the cost of 
disposing the material.  Only Hanley and Slark (1994) estimate recycling to be 
economically beneficial for the recycling of newspaper in Scotland.  Palmer et al. 
(1997) estimate the benefits of recycling exceed the costs if the recycling rate is less 
than 7.5% of total waste.  Recycling beyond this threshold is costly. 
Kinnaman (1998) and Jakus et al. (1996) estimate the political/environmental 
benefits of curbside recycling through use of contingent valuation surveys.  In a 
survey of 100 households, Kinnaman (1998) finds that households are on average 
willing to pay about $86 per year to keep curbside recycling of newspaper, glass, and 
aluminum.  Jakus et al. (1996) estimate that households are willing to pay $69.36 per 
year for curbside collection of newspaper and glass.  In addition, Tiller et al. (1997) 
estimate that suburban households that classify themselves as recyclers are willing to 
pay $11.74 per month for drop-off recycling facilities.  If such preferences influence 
the decisions of local officials, then some of the trend towards greater recycling may 
in fact be attributable to political or environmental forces.   
Other studies have estimated the costs of curbside recycling programs.  Judge 
and Becker (1993) estimate that such costs increase with the addition of weekly 
collection (as opposed to monthly) of commingled (rather than separated) material 
collected from the porch of households (rather than the curb).  Carroll (1997) uses 
self-reported cost figures from 1,103 programs in the state of Wisconsin to estimate 
that the costs of curbside recycling programs increase with the population, the tons 
recycled, and the number of materials collected.  Interestingly, Carroll does not find a 
relationship between population density and collection costs.  Bohm et al. (1999) 
estimate the costs of recycling with data based on a national survey of 1,021 
municipal recycling programs in the United States.  They find that the average costs 
of recycling decrease with the quantity collected, indicating economies of scale in 
collection.  The total costs of recycling are estimated to increase with the cost of 
labor, the cost of capital, and if the municipality collects the material rather than a 
private company.  Butterfield and Kubursi (1993) also find that recycling is costly.  
Laws that require or encourage recycling in Canada are found to decrease 
employment levels in several industries. 
Huhtala (1997) and Brisson (1997) break down the private and external costs 
of recycling by type of material.  Huhtala develops a dynamic model of waste 
accumulation with recycling as a backstop technology.  The model is simulated using 
1993 data from the Helsinki region.  Results show that the social benefits of 
recycling paper, cardboard, and metal exceed the social costs.  Glass and plastic do 
not pass the benefit/cost criterion.  Brisson (1997) finds that the recycling of 
aluminum produces the greatest social benefits, followed by glass, ferrous metals, 
paper board, and rigid plastic. 
As described above, several states in America have implemented recycling 
goals.  England has also set a 50% recycling goal and the Netherlands set a goal for 
plastics of 42%.  Palmer et al. (1997) and Huhtala (1997) estimate the optimal 
recycling rate.  Using the lowest cost policy to encourage recycling (a deposit-refund 
of $45 per ton), Palmer et al. (1997) find that only 7% of solid waste should be 
recycled in the United States (where the social marginal cost of garbage disposal is 
estimated to be $33 per ton).  Huhtala (1997) find the optimal recycling rate to be 
between 31% and 52% in Finland (where the private marginal cost of garbage 
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disposal is estimated at $101/ton).  In addition, Huhtala (1997) adds a contingent 
valuation estimate of the non-market benefits of recycling to the analysis.  Such 
benefits include the value of less air pollution from solid waste incinerators plus an 
estimate of the “environmental friendliness of recycling”. 
To ensure participation in the curbside recycling program, some local 
governments have passed a local ordinance making it illegal to include recyclable 
waste with regular garbage.  As mentioned above, several states have passed laws 
requiring all towns to implement such mandatory ordinances.  Kinnaman and 
Fullerton (1997) find mandatory recycling ordinances have little significant impact 
on recycling or garbage quantities.  A plausible reason for this non-result is that 
municipalities do not adequately enforce their mandatory ordinances.  Garbage 
collectors rarely inspect household garbage carefully.  Any found violators usually 
just receive a written warning (Kinnaman, 1998).  Duggal et al. (1991) find that 
communities that enforce mandatory recycling laws with fines experience no more 
recycling than towns without such enforcement. 
Four thousand local governments have also implemented unit-based pricing 
programs.  Most empirical papers devoted to user fees for garbage collection estimate 
the impact of the programs on household garbage and recycling behavior. These 
studies are discussed in Section 5 below.  In addition to estimating the incidence of 
the programs, a few studies have estimated the likelihood such programs are 
implemented, the change in illegal dumping, and the benefits and costs of 
implementing a price-per-bag.  Miranda and Aldy (1998) provide an in-depth 
analysis of the experiences of nine communities in the United States that 
implemented a price-per-bag. 
 Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) and Callan and Thomas (1999) estimate the 
likelihood that a community will implement a unit-based pricing program.  
Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) use data representing a national cross-section of 909 
communities with and without unit-based pricing programs.  They find that the 
likelihood increases with the local tipping fee, with the use of municipal (rather than 
private) resources to collect garbage, and with the education level of the community.  
Callan and Thomas (1999) find that the likelihood increases with household income, 
housing value, the age of the population, and whether the regional landfill is due to 
close within the next two years.  They use data representing 317 communities in 
Massachusetts. 
 Available data rarely allow for direct comparisons between illegal dumping 
quantities before and after the implementation of unit pricing.  Many economists 
have requested town officials to provide their opinion over whether they believe 
illegal dumping has increased.  Many local officials have stated that it has, though 
many more have stated otherwise.  Reschovsky and Stone (1994) and Fullerton and 
Kinnaman (1996) asked individual households whether they observed any change.  In 
the former study, 51% of respondents reported an increase in dumping.  The most 
popular method was household use of commercial dumpsters.  For the 20% who 
admitted to burning trash, the authors were unable to confirm whether these burners 
did so in response to the program.  Roughly 40% of the respondents to the Fullerton 
and Kinnaman (1996) survey indicated that illegal dumping had increased in 
response to the unit-pricing program.  Many of these lived in the more densely 
populated urban areas of the city.  Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) also use survey 
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responses with direct household garbage observations to estimate that 28% of the 
reduction of garbage observed at the curb was redirected to illicit forms of disposal.  
See Footnote 4 for a list of other papers that study the dumping issue. 
 Two types of unit-based programs have been implemented in the United 
States.  Traditional bag or tag programs require households to pay for each additional 
bag of garbage presented at the curb for collection.  The second program type 
requires households to pre-commit or “subscribe” to the collection of a specific 
number of containers each week.  The household pays for the subscribed number 
whether these containers are filled with garbage or not.  Many communities in 
California and Oregon have utilized subscription programs since early in the century.  
One advantage of subscription programs is that their direct billing systems may 
reduce administrative costs. Yet, economists believe the first type of user fee more 
truly represents marginal cost pricing.  Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) use city-wide 
data from over 700 communities to estimate that subscription programs have less of 
an impact than bag/tag programs on garbage and recycling quantities.  Miranda and 
Aldy (1998) find that subscription programs can be effective if pricing applies to 
smaller trash containers.  Nestor and Podolsky (1998) employ self-reported 
household data to estimate that subscription programs are about as effective as 
bag/tag programs at reducing garbage.  Neither program is found to encourage source 
reduction in the presence of a curbside recycling program, since such programs 
subsidize recycling households' overall disposal practices. 
 
B. Policy Directives in Europe 
 Many of the approaches taken above in the United States have also been 
pursued, to a greater or lesser extent, in other countries.  For example, the United 
Kingdom has established a 50% recycling goal to be achieved by 2000.  The current 
recycling rate in the UK is just 5% (Powell et al., 1996).  To increase the recycling 
rate, the UK implemented credits for recycling and has been considering a tax on the 
disposal of solid waste in landfills.  Seven other EC countries (Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxenbourg, and the Netherlands) have implemented some 
variation of user fees for garbage collection.  The UK rejected the idea of user fees 
due to the uncertainty of their effects.  Also, deposit-refund systems for beverage 
containers have been implemented in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and 
Switzerland.  Germany has also implemented deposit-refund programs for detergent 
and paint containers. 
Germany implemented a unique policy in 1991 called the “Law on Waste 
Management” that is designed to internalize the external costs of packaging choices 
by industry.  This law requires the original product manufacturers to pay to recycle 
the packaging it produces even after the product is sold to retail firms or directly to 
consumers.  The law also set an original recycling target of 80%.  That is, firms 
would be required to recycle 80% of all packaging they produce.  Amendments to the 
original legislation are expected to ease these targets to 60-70%.   
 Over 400 retail and packaging firms have combined with the large waste-
hauling firms to create the Duales System of Deutschland (DSD).  The purpose of 
this syndicate is to reduce the administrative costs associated with satisfying the 
minimum recycling standards.  Rather than requiring that each bottle be delivered 
back to its original manufacturer, local waste management firms agree to collect for 
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recycling all bottles of member organizations in exchange for payment from the 
DSD.  Participating manufacturers identify their membership in the DSD by affixing 
a green dot on their packaging.  In essence, the program becomes a national recycling 
effort operated by the DSD rather than by independent municipal governments, as is 
common in the United States.11 
 The collection, sorting, and marketing costs incurred by the waste 
management firms are paid by the DSD.  The DSD then charges manufacturers 
according to the quantity and type of packaging used.  For example, manufacturers 
pay the DSD $.82 for each pound of plastic packaging produced, $.27 per pound for 
aluminum, and only $.04 for each pound of glass. These charges represent the 
marginal cost to the DSD of collecting and sorting each type of material.  The cost of 
glass is low because consumers traditionally separate and transport glass bottles 
themselves, these costs are paid by consumers and are therefore not internalized by 
the DSD or product manufacturers.  Fullerton and Wu (1998) find that if the charges 
to manufacturers are set optimally, then the German Green Dot program can 
encourage firms to produce the optimal amount and type of packaging.  The quantity 
of packaging consumed by households decreased by 4% following the 
implementation of the Green Dot program (Rousso and Shah, 1994) 
 The success of the Green Dot program in achieving the efficient quantities of 
garbage and recycling rests on two critical issues (Fenton and Hanley, 1995).  First, 
households must be willing to separate materials for recycling.  A mandatory deposit 
on non-refillable beverage containers gives consumers the incentive to return these 
forms of packaging.  But lacking such incentives for other types of packaging, the 
household cannot be expected to recycle efficiently.  Second, private collectors must 
recycle the materials.  But in the absence of other regulations, the private collectors 
face private rather than social disposal costs.  Thus, the collectors of recyclable 
material may find disposal in other countries cheaper than negotiating with a recycler 
to take the material.12  Palmer and Walls (1999) argue that replacing Extended 
Producer Responsibility programs (like the Green Dot program) with a combined tax 
on intermediate goods and a subsidy paid to the collectors of recycled materials could 
alleviate these problems while preserving the more desirable outcomes. 
Countries within the European Union have implemented other versions of 
producer responsibility programs, but few have set recycling goals as lofty as 
Germany’s 60-70% target.  Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden have made manufacturers at least partly responsible for the management of 
their packaging materials.  The European Union itself has set a recycling target of 
between 50% and 75% to be met by the year 2000, and is watching the German 
experience carefully.  The UK has dropped its national eco-labeling program but is 
cooperating with all other EU policy guidelines. 
                                                 
11
 Michaelis (1995) and Roussa and Shah (1994) provide further background on 
Germany’s green dot program. 
12
 Such concerns arose after several packages with green dots were found in French 
landfills.  In response, the European Union recently banned the export of recyclable 
materials headed for foreign landfills or incinerators.  Reliable data are not available 
to characterize the quantity of residential solid waste that is shipped between 
European countries. Europe has been exporting solid waste to Africa. 
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C. Developing Nations 
 This paper is concerned predominantly with residential solid waste in 
industrialized countries, but we discuss briefly some events in less developed 
countries.  Solid waste management is a different story in developing countries.  
First, only 50-70% of the solid waste generated is actually collected (Cointreau-
Levine, 1994).  Second, the collection that does take place is very labor intensive.  
Households bring garbage to transfer stations, or collectors (scavengers) agree to 
carry garbage to a transfer station in exchange for any recyclable material found in 
the garbage.  The World Bank estimates that 7,000 such workers operate in Manila, 
8,000 in Jakarta, and 10,000 in Mexico City.  In poorer sections of Egypt, India, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines, individuals using handcarts collect garbage door-to-
door (Beede and Bloom, 1995). 
 The experiences in developing countries have allowed economists to estimate 
the relationship between per-capita income and garbage generation rates.  Beede and 
Bloom (1995) find that per-day garbage generation rates vary between 0.5 kilograms 
per-capita in underdeveloped Mozambique to 1.9 kilograms per-capita in developed 
Australia.  These cross-national data are used to estimate that the income elasticity of 
supply of garbage is 0.34, quite similar to estimates based on data sets gathered 
entirely within developed countries (described below).  On the policy front, Cyprus, 
Egypt, India, Lebanon, and Syria have implemented deposit-refund systems for glass 
containers. 
 
5. A Model of Household Behavior with Empirical Implications 
 The household is at center stage in the market for solid waste collection and 
disposal because the household chooses among various abatement options, including 
whether to devote resources to the separation and storage of recyclable materials.  
Every policy discussed above from a tax on virgin materials to a per-bag user fee on 
garbage disposal or the German green dot program depend crucially on household 
behavior to influence disposal quantities. 
 The model of household disposal decisions developed in Section 3 derived 
normative propositions about the optimal pricing of garbage, recycling, and virgin 
material.  The model developed in this section can be used to derive empirical 
propositions for testing and estimation.  This model is quite simple, but demonstrates 
the main forces influencing the disposal decisions of households.  Specific functional 
forms are assigned to the equations above to simplify the interpretation of results.  
Some of the comparative statics generated from the model are tested in the available 
economics literature. 
 Assume the household consumes a single composite commodity good  c  that 
generates waste material  m, according to 
 
(1)    m = (1/α)c, 
 
where  1/α  is the portion of consumption that forms waste material.  Assume  (1/α) 
< 1.  Material  m  can either be presented at the curb for garbage collection (g) or 
recycled (r): 
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(2)    m = g + r. 
 
Since these two equations imply that  c = α(g + r), they are just a more restrictive 
version of the expression c = c(g, r) given in Section 3 above. 
 Household utility is a function of it’s own consumption of the composite 
commodity good, 
 
(3)    u = u(c), 
 
where  uC > 0  and  uCC < 0.  The impact of aggregate garbage (G) on household 
utility is suppressed here for ease of presentation.  Households do not notice a change 
in aggregate garbage attributable to their own disposal when making such choices. 
 Instead of having fixed income as in Section 3 above, the household here is 
endowed with k  units of a resource such as time that can be exchanged in a labor 
market  km  for a wage  pk.  Therefore, y = pkkm.  The household resource can also be 
used to prepare waste material for recycling (kr). The resource is fully employed  (km 
+ kr = k ). 
 The amount of recycling generated by the household (r) is a function of the 
time allocated to recycling (kr), 
 
(4)    r = r(kr), 
 
where the marginal product of labor in recycling is positive (rk > 0) and labor devoted 
to recycling experiences diminishing marginal returns (rkk < 0).  Equation (4) can be 
solved for  kr  to give the cost of recycling: 
 
(5)    kr = k(r), 
 
where  kr > 0  and  krr > 0.  For simplification, we specify 
 
(6)    k(r) = 0.5δr2 
 
where the first derivative  kr = δr  and the second derivative  krr = δ.  Thus  δ  is the 
rate at which the marginal cost rises with  r.  A decrease in the parameter  δ  implies 
less household effort is required for recycling. 
 Household income (pk k   - pkkr) can either be used to purchase the composite 
commodity good (for a price  pc), or to pay for each bag of garbage (at cost  pg) 
presented at the curb for collection.  Using (6) to substitute for  kr  in the above 
resource constraint, the household’s budget constraint is: 
 
(7)    pk k  - pk(0.5δr2) = pcc + pgg. 
 
 Each household maximizes utility (3) subject to technological constraints (1) 
and (2) and the budget constraint (7), by choosing the quantity of material to discard 
(g) and to recycle (r).  The Lagrange Function from this maximization problem is 
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(8)  L = u[α(g + r)] + λ[pk k  - α(g + r)pc – pgg – pk(0.5δr2)]. 
 
Assuming the existence of interior solutions for  g  and  r, first-order conditions are 
 
(9a)    αuc/λ = [αpc + pg] 
(9b)    αuc/λ = [αpc + pkδr] 
(9c)    pk k  - α(g + r)pc – pgg – pkk(r) = 0 
 
where  λ  is the marginal utility of income.  At the utility-maximizing choices, 
condition (9a) requires the marginal benefit of acquiring an additional unit of 
material (measured in dollars) to equal the purchase price of the material plus the 
price of discarding the material at the curb.  Condition (9b) has a similar 
interpretation, except the marginal cost of acquiring an additional unit of material is 
comprised of the purchase price plus the resource cost of recycling it (pkδr = pkkr).  
Solving conditions (9a) and (9b) provides the relationship  pg = pkδr  at the utility-
maximizing choices of  g  and  r.  The household increases recycling to the point 
where the marginal cost of recycling another unit of the material (pkδr*) equals the 
marginal cost of discarding the material (pg). 
 Utility-maximizing solutions for the choice variables take the form: 
 
(10a)    g* = g*(α, k , pc, pg, pk, δ) 
(10b)    r* = r*(α, k , pc, pg, pk, δ) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) can be used to solve for the utility-maximizing consumption 
level, 
 
(11)    c* = α(g* + r*). 
 
 How would the equilibrium values of  g*  and  r*  be affected by an 
exogenous change in the values of  pg,  δ,  pk, or  α?  The comparative statics 
reported below are obtained by first substituting the solutions (10) into the first-order 
conditions (9), then differentiating with respect to the exogenous variable of interest, 
and finally solving the system of differential equations for the comparative static 
terms (as in Silberberg, 1990, page 323).13 
                                                 
13
 One implication of the model presented here is that if the price of garbage is zero, 
then the household has no incentive to engage in recycling since garbage is free and 
recycling requires scarce household resources.  This result is clearly inconsistent with 
the available data.  In fact, Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) find that 73.3% of 
households recycled even in the absence of any legal or economic incentive.  Why do 
these households recycle?  Even if households value the quality of the environment 
(a public good) and their recycling efforts improve the quality of the environment, 
households cannot be expected to provide this public good at their own cost.  
Perhaps households simply enjoy recycling or feel a civic duty to participate in the 
recycling program.  Understanding why households have been willing to participate 
 -24- 
  
 
A. A Change in the User Fee (pg) 
 If the town has implemented a unit pricing program, the representative 
household in the model is required to pay for each bag of garbage collection (pg).  
How will the household respond to an increase in the per-bag fee?  Comparative 
static analysis indicates that the change in recycling attributable to a change in the 
value of the user fee is14 
 
(12)    01* >≡
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which is unambiguously positive.  A household will respond to an increase in the 
user fee by increasing recycling.  This increase varies across households with 
different wage levels (pk), and would be the greatest for households with the lowest 
wage.  The increase also varies across households with different recycling production 
functions (value of  δ  in Equation 6).  The change in recycling would be greater for a 
household that experiences less-rapidly diminishing marginal product of time in 
recycling (a low value of  δ).  Proxies for  δ  could include household size, age 
composition, and other demographic variables. 
 An increase in the price per bag of garbage collection also changes the utility-
maximizing quantity of garbage discarded15: 
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which is unambiguously negative.  Households are predicted to respond to an 
increase in the value of the user fee by decreasing the quantity of garbage presented 
at the curb.  The first component of the right-hand side might be called the 
“substitution” effect since it represents the change in garbage directly attributable to 
the increase in recycling.  The second component of this comparative static might be 
called the “income” effect since it represents the decrease in garbage brought about 
by the reduction in material generated from less consumption.  The increase in the 
price per bag reduces the amount of income available to purchase other goods, 
decreasing the quantity of waste material.  To see this more formally, note that 
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in municipal recycling programs remains an interesting question to economists and 
policy makers. 
14
 A simple way to see this result is to solve (9a) and (9b) to get  r = pg/δpk  and then 
differentiate that with respect to  pg. 
15
 This result requires the use of all equations (9) and (10). 
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Relative to the average household, this “income” effect is greatest for households 
that generate more garbage (high g*), generate more waste material from 
consumption (low  α), exhibit a low marginal utility of consumption (low  uc,  
perhaps because of a large  c*), or possess a high marginal utility of income (λ*) .  
The denominator of (14) is identical to the left-hand side of the first-order condition 
in (9a).  A household that experiences a low marginal benefit of generating an 
additional unit of waste material (αuc/λ*) will react to the user fee by reducing 
garbage more than other households. 
 To see why the income effect only reduces  g  and not  r  in this simple 
model, consider Figure 6.  Total waste (g + r) on the horizontal axis is divided 
between  r*  and  g*  at the point where the flat marginal cost of  g  (equal to  pg) 
intersects the rising marginal cost of  r  (equal to  pkδr).  When the income effect 
reduces consumption  c  (and thus the sum  g + r), the right vertical axis shifts to the 
left, reducing  g  but leaving  r  unchanged. 
Several economic papers have estimated these comparative static 
relationships.  A brief overview of some of these studies appears in Table 3.  One 
element common to every study mentioned in Table 3 is the use of original data.  
Data collection techniques include interviews with local solid waste officials, direct 
phoning of households, and actual measurement of household waste. 
Wertz (1976) was the first to derive the impact of a user fee on garbage 
quantities.  By simply comparing the average quantity of garbage collected in San 
Francisco, a town with a user fee, with the average town in the United States, Wertz 
calculates a price elasticity of demand equal to –0.15. 
 Jenkins (1993) expanded the understanding of the impact of user fees on 
garbage totals by gathering monthly data from 14 towns (10 with unit-pricing) over 
several years.  Jenkins also found inelastic demand for garbage collection services; a 
1% increase in the user fee is estimated to lead to a 0.12 percent decrease in the 
quantity of garbage. 
Two studies rely on self-reported garbage quantities from individual 
households (rather than as reported by municipal governments).  Hong et al. (1993) 
utilize data based on 4,306 surveys.  Households indicate whether they recycle and 
how much they pay for garbage collection.  Results indicate that a user fee increases 
the probability that a household recycles, but does not appreciably affect the quantity 
of garbage produced at the curb.  Reschovsky and Stone (1994) mailed 
questionnaires to 3040 households and received 1422 replies.  Each household 
reported its recycling behavior and income and demographic information.  The price 
of garbage was estimated to have no significant impact on the probability that a 
household recycles.  When combined with a curbside recycling program, recycling 
rates increase by 27 to 58%, depending on type of material.   
 Miranda et al. (1994) gather data from 21 communities with unit-pricing 
programs and compare the quantity of garbage and recycling over the year preceding 
the implementation of unit-pricing with the year following it.  Results indicate that 
these towns reduce garbage by between 17% and 74% and increase recycling by 
128%.  These large estimates cannot be attributed directly to pricing garbage, since in 
every program curbside recycling programs were implemented during the same year 
as the unit-pricing program.  Callan and Thomas (1997) predict that the 
implementation of a user fee increases the portion of waste recycled by 6.6 
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percentage points.  This impact increases to 12.1% points when the user fee is 
accompanied by a curbside recycling program. 
 Only Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) use household data that are not based 
on self-reported surveys.  The weight and volume of the garbage and recycling of 75 
households were measured by hand over four weeks prior to, and following, the 
implementation of a price-per-bag program in Charlottesville, VA.  A curbside 
recycling program had already been in operation for over one year.  Results indicate 
that the weight of garbage decreased slightly, but the volume of garbage (number of 
bags or cans) decreased by more.  Indeed, the density of garbage increased from 15 
pounds per bag to just over 20 pounds per bag. 
 Two studies expanded on the work of Jenkins (1993) by increasing the 
number of communities in the sample.  Podolsky and Spiegel (1998) employ a 1992 
cross-section of 159 towns clustered in New Jersey, twelve with unit-based pricing 
programs.  They estimate the largest price elasticity of demand in the literature (-
0.39).  The authors attribute this estimate to the fact that no towns in their sample had 
implemented subscription programs (as was the case for Wertz and Jenkins) and had 
mature recycling programs in place.  Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) use a 1991 
national cross- section of 959 towns, 114 that implemented user fees (none with 
subscription programs).  The estimated demand elasticities are also higher than 
Jenkins, but not as large as Podolsky and Spiegel (1998).  The Kinnaman and 
Fullerton estimates account for possible endogeneity of the policy variables.  They 
find that towns with high garbage totals and low recycling totals are more likely to 
introduce a user fee.  Previous estimates may have under-reported this elasticity by 
assuming that these policy variables are exogenous. 
 Strathman et al. (1995) employ data obtained by officials near Portland, OR, 
and they find that a 10% increase in the tipping fee decreases garbage disposed at the 
landfill by 1.1%.16  Seguino et al. (1995) find that the implementation of user fee 
programs in 29 towns in Maine decrease solid waste by 8.73 pounds per person per 
week (a 56% decrease).  Regarding illegal dumping, almost half of the towns 
reported initial increases in roadside dumping, and over half reported increases in 
backyard burning (30% say it is a continuing problem).  Backyard burning is 
permitted in the state of Maine.   
Only Klein and Robison (1993) estimate the impact of disposal fees on 
commercial behavior. Firms are estimated to reduce solid waste generation when 
faced with higher disposal rates. 
 What can be learned from all of these empirical studies?  First, demand for 
garbage collection services is inelastic.  Substitutes are not readily available.  
Advocates of unit-based pricing suggest demand may become more elastic in the 
long run as households learn of available substitutes for garbage disposal.  The 
empirical economics literature has yet to address this point. 
 
B. A Change in Ease of Recycling (δ) 
 Recall that household resources are required to recycle materials.  According 
to the cost function given in (6), the implementation of a curbside recycling can be 
                                                 
16
 Nestor and Podolsky (1996) published a comment suggesting that the changes in 
tipping fees may not have been passed on to households - the generators of garbage. 
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modeled by a decrease in the value of  δ.  Many expect the ease of curbside recycling 
to increase the quantity of recycling chosen by the household.  Comparative static 
results of the model make a similar prediction,17 
 
(15)    0** <−≡
δ∂δ
∂ rr
 
 
Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) confirm that this effect is positive.  The 
implementation of a curbside recycling program is estimated to increase the annual 
quantity of recycling by 195 pounds per person (this estimate corrects for policy 
endogeneity).  Reschovsky and Stone (1994) also find that a recycling program, 
especially when combined with a mandatory ordinance, increases recycling rates.  
Callan and Thomas (1997) find that a curbside recycling program increases by 4.15% 
the ratio of material recycled to all materials disposed.  This impact increases to 
9.67% when the curbside recycling program is accompanied with a unit-based 
pricing program. 
The comparative static result in (15) predicts a greater than average increase 
in recycling for households that already recycle (a high  r*) and households that are 
very efficient recyclers (have a low value of  δ).  Reschovsky and Stone (1994) find 
that households reporting adequate storage space are much more likely to report that 
they recycle (using self-reported data).  Judge and Becker (1993) study the recycling 
habits of 1000 households in towns of Minnesota (with different program attributes).  
They estimate that recycling totals are increased by allowing households to co-mingle 
recyclable materials, offering weekly collections (rather than biweekly), and not 
requiring households to put materials on the curb.  They also find that special 
information about the recycling program did not increase recycling when controlling 
for other factors.  Once a curbside recycling program has been implemented, Duggal 
et al. (1991) estimate that recycling totals increase with the age of the program, the 
frequency of collection, and the number of items collected. 
 The model does not provide a refutable hypothesis regarding the change in 
garbage attributable to the implementation of a curbside recycling program, 
 
(16)   0*)(** <>






−
−
= or
u
rkprg
c
k
λ
α
δ
∂δ
∂
∂δ
∂
 
 
 The implementation of a municipal recycling program diverts some material 
from the garbage pile to the recycling pile (thus the first component of the 
comparative static is positive), but it frees up additional household resources for 
consumption, which may result in more material (the second term is negative).  In 
order for the overall effect to be negative, the first component must exceed the 
second in absolute value.  Most policymakers believe the direction of the 
comparative static in (16) to be positive.  That is, the implementation of a curbside 
recycling program (a decrease in  δ) reduces garbage. 
                                                 
17
 From (9a,b) we get  r = pg/δpk, so differentiation yields  ∂r/∂δ = -pg/δ2pk = -r/δ. 
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 The empirical evidence testing that assumption is inconclusive.  Only 
Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) estimate the impact of curbside recycling on 
household garbage totals, but they find the impact on garbage is not statistically 
significant.   
 
C. A Change in the Wage (pk) 
 Households may also change their utility-maximizing disposal choices with a 
change in their wage.  As the wage rises, households face a higher opportunity cost 
of recycling and thus may recycle less.  The comparative static result verifies this 
claim: 
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Relative to the average household, this negative effect is greater for households that 
recycle more (r) or earn low wages (pk).  Thus, poorer households are expected to 
respond to an increase in wage by decreasing recycling by a greater amount than 
richer households, ceteris paribus. 
 Hong et al. (1993) test the relationship in (17).  They regress the probability 
of recycling on the wage rate of the female member of the household and find that as 
the wage rate increases, the probability of recycling decreases.  Kinnaman (1994) 
also finds that recycling decreases with the number of full-time workers in the 
household. 
 A change in the wage is also predicted to affect the optimal quantity of 
garbage:  
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which is unambiguously positive.  Again, this comparative static can be partitioned 
into an “income” and “substitution” effect.  Part of the increase in garbage is a direct 
result of the decrease in recycling.  The remaining portion arises from the fact that 
more material is being generated by the household with the higher wage.  In Figure 6, 
the marginal cost of recycling (pkδr) would rotate upward with the increase in  pk, so  
r  falls.  Garbage is increased both by the decrease in recycling and by the rightward 
shift of the right vertical axis. This can be expressed more formally by: 
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The increase in total waste material is particularly high for households that devote 
more time to working (high km) since these households will enjoy the greatest boost 
to income for an increase in  pk.   Ceteris paribus, households that experience a low 
marginal benefit of consumption (αuc/λ*) will generate more additional material than 
the average household (following a boost in pk). 
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 Though Hong et al. (1993) find a positive relationship between garbage and 
the wage rate, the estimate is statistically insignificant.  Podolsky and Spiegel (1998) 
estimate that an increase in the ratio of employees to household members increases 
garbage.  Kinnaman (1994) also finds that an increase in the portion of the household 
that are full-time workers increases garbage. 
 
D. A Change in α 
 The portion of consumption that becomes waste material (1/α) is exogenous 
to the household.18  This exogenous value of  α  could change if firms reduce the 
quantity of material used to package their products.19  How would households 
respond to an exogenous change in  α?  The comparative static results are20 
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An increase in the value of  α  is interpreted as a decrease in the portion of 
consumption that becomes waste material.  Households respond to this increase by 
decreasing garbage, but do not change recycling.  The change in garbage is especially 
large for households that discard a high amount of material (m*), face high prices for 
goods and services (pc), or experience a low marginal benefit of acquiring an 
additional unit of material (αuc/λ*).  No empirical evidence has been found to test 
these predictions. 
 
E. Other Considerations 
 Many of the empirical studies mentioned above control for income and 
demographic variables in the regression when estimating the quantity of garbage and 
recycling produced by households.  The estimated coefficients on these variables 
could assist local governments to forecast future garbage disposal needs. 
 A change in the wage rate, as modeled above, has both an income effect and a 
price effect (on the cost of recycling).  The pure income effect of a change in 
nonlabor income on household garbage has been estimated in several empirical 
studies.  This relationship could be expected to be positive if additional income 
implies more consumption and garbage.  However, if increases in income are spent 
on dining out and longer vacations, household garbage totals could decrease with 
income.  The empirical literature finds more evidence supporting the former 
                                                 
18
  An extension of the model would allow  α  to be a choice variable.  Households 
could choose the mix of consumption goods to include less waste-intensive goods.  
Additional constraints would have to be imposed on the current model, or 
households here would simply choose  α  to be  0. 
19
 See Fullerton and Wu (1998) for a further discussion of the packaging decisions of 
firms. 
20
 Again, the first result follows directly from differentiating  r = pg/δpk. 
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prediction.  In fact, Podolsky and Spiegel (1998) find the strongest relationship 
between garbage quantities and income by estimating the income elasticity of 
demand for garbage collection to be 0.55.  Other studies also find a positive but 
weaker relationship between income and garbage. Jenkins (1993) estimates an 
income elasticity of demand equal to 0.41, Wertz (1976) at 0.279 and 0.272 using 
two sets of data, Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) at 0.262, Richardson and Havlicek 
(1978) at 0.242, 0.22 by Reschovsky and Stone (1994), 0.2 by Petrovic and Jaffee 
(1978), and finally 0.049 by Hong et al. (1993).  Strathman et al. (1995) find that 
garbage disposed at landfill decreases with the average manufacturing income of the 
city.   
 The effect of nonlabor income on recycling is not as well understood.  (The 
simple model in Figure 6 would predict no effect.)  Callan and Thomas (1997) and 
Duggal et al. (1991) find that income increases household recycling quantities, but 
Hong et al. (1993) find income does not impact self-reported recycling participation.  
Jakus et al. (1996) find income increases the recycling of paper but not glass.  
Saltzman et al. (1993) find that additional income increases the recycling of 
newspaper but decreases the recycling of glass. 
 Economists have also estimated the relationship between education and 
household garbage totals.  Educated households could be more aware of recycling 
opportunities.  Educated households may also have greater tastes for the 
environment.  Indeed, Hong et al. (1993), Callan and Thomas (1997), Judge and 
Becker (1993), Reschovsky and Stone (1994), and Duggal et al. (1991) find 
education increases recycling.  Using household data, Kinnaman (1994) estimates 
that educated households produce less garbage.  Using a cross-section of 959 
communities, Kinnaman and Fullerton (1997) find a similar result.  Though Judge 
and Becker (1993) find no impact from publicity efforts to increase the awareness of 
municipal recycling opportunities, Callan and Thomas (1997) find that an extra 
dollar spent per household on such efforts increases the recycling rate by 2.55%. 
 The effects of other demographic variables have also been estimated.  Jenkins 
(1993), Kinnaman (1994), and Podolsky and Spiegel (1998) find that increases in the 
size of the household decrease the per-capita quantity of garbage disposed.  Larger 
families could share meals in a way that produces less waste than the same number 
of people eating separately.  Hong et al. (1993) find that larger households also are 
more likely to report participation in recycling.  Regarding the age of the household 
and its impact on garbage totals, Podolsky and Spiegel (1998) find that an increase in 
median age decreases garbage.  Jenkins (1993) finds that an increase in the portion of 
population between 18 and 49 increases garbage.  Jakus et al. (1996) find that older 
individuals are more likely to recycle glass.  Kinnaman (1994) estimates that 
households with married couples produce less per-capita garbage and recycling.  
Reschovsky and Stone (1994) find that married households produce more total 
recycling (not controlling for household size).  Finally, Kinnaman (1994) estimates 
that homeowners produce more garbage and recycling than renters do. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 The solid waste collection and disposal industry has undergone dramatic 
changes over the past two decades.  First, the structure of landfills has changed from 
local town dumps to large regional landfills equipped to reduce the negative 
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externalities associated with garbage disposal.  Second, Japan, much of Europe, and 
the northeast regions of the United States have turned to incineration to manage 
residential solid waste since the 1970’s.  Financially, incineration has been most 
successful where land is scarce (and hence the costs of landfills are high).  Some still 
question the environmental benefits of incineration.  Third, the portion of solid waste 
that is recycled has risen sharply over the past decade.  This growth has been 
facilitated by greater government involvement designed to encourage households to 
separate waste.  The growth in the supply of recycled materials has resulted in a 
short-run glut of materials, and governments have been active in finding markets for 
these materials.  Several states in the U.S. have passed an assortment of policies with 
this goal in mind.  Finally, roughly 4000 local communities in the U.S. have begun to 
price garbage by the bag.  These local programs have helped to pay the rising costs of 
disposal in some areas, and they provide an incentive for households to recycle more.  
The extent to which these programs produce positive net benefits is still debated in 
the economics literature. 
As residential solid waste became a more important issue to policy makers, 
intellectual attention from economists increased.  The number of economic papers 
devoted to residential solid waste and recycling has risen sharply over the past 10 
years.  The bulk of these papers provide empirical estimates of the effects of 
government policies on household disposal behavior.  Another portion is devoted to 
prescribing the efficient policy approach.  Most models support the use of some form 
of a “deposit-refund” system.  The deposit or advanced disposal fee could be applied 
at either the point of production or purchase.  The refund or subsidy to recycling 
could be given to households that recycle or to firms that purchase recycled 
materials.  Other economic models support a tax on virgin material or a direct tax on 
the household’s disposal choices. 
Even though the economic literature has reached some consensus over the 
choice of policy directives, very few of these recommendations have been pursued 
explicitly by the policy-making community.  Advanced disposal fees exist only for 
some products in some countries.  Explicit recycling subsidies are also few and far 
between.  Deposit-refund systems have been implemented only for beverage 
containers and have only been implemented in some countries.  Perhaps additional 
work could design structures for these policies to help minimize the administrative 
costs.  Palmer and Walls (1999) have begun work in this area.  On the other hand, 
many jurisdictions already have implicit deposit-refund systems on all goods, to the 
extent that they impose a general sales tax on all purchases and use some of the 
money to pay for free curbside recycling collection. 
Many economic predictions have been confirmed by empirical work: a higher 
price per bag of garbage is found to reduce demand for garbage collection, and higher 
incomes are found to increase waste for disposal.  Other behaviors are not yet well 
understood, however, such as observed amounts of recycling even when households 
have no incentive to recycle. 
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Figure 1: Disposal Trends (%)
Source: Biocycle Magazine
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Figure 3: Price Index of Recyclable Materials
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (1982=100)
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Figure 4: Landfill Crisis?
Source: Biocycle Magazine
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Figure 5: Number of Incinerators
Source: Biocycle Magazine
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Figure 6: The Choice of Garbage (g) and Recycling (r) 
 
S.E. I.E. 
r g r* 
$/unit 
0 
pkδr  =  mc of  r 
pg = mc of  g 
g + r = c/α 
An increase in  pg  raises the flat marginal cost of garbage disposal (mc of g).  It thus 
moves  r*  to the right by a substitution effect (S.E.), and it moves the right-hand 
origin (c/α) to the left by an income effect (I.E.).  Both effects reduce garbage  g. 
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TABLE 1: USE OF LANDFILLS FOR WASTE DISPOSAL IN EUROPE 
 
 
COUNTRY 
 
PERCENT LANDFILLED 
(NET OF RECYCLING) 
 
Denmark 
 
44 
 
France 
 
54 
 
Greece 
 
100 
 
Ireland 
 
100 
 
Italy 
 
85 
 
Netherlands 
 
56-61 
 
Sweden 
 
35-49 
 
Switzerland 
 
22-25 
 
United Kingdom 
 
90 
 
United States 
 
90 
 
West Germany 
 
 
66-74 
 
 
Source: Jenkins (1993), based on data gathered by: US Congress, Office of  
Technology Assessment (1989). 
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TABLE 2: U.S. STATE POLICIES DESIGNED TO INCREASE RECYCLING 
 
  
 
POLICY 
NUMBER OF STATES 
IMPLEMENTED 
  
Pass a recycling goal 45 
  
Require all municipalities to implement curbside recycling 
programs and pass a local ordinances making household and 
commercial recycling mandatory 
 
7 
  
Require all municipalities to implement curbside or drop-off 
recycling programs but not a mandatory ordinance 
 
7 
  
Require all municipalities and counties to satisfy a minimum 
recycling quota without designating the method to achieve it 
 
8 
  
Provide grants to municipalities to help finance recycling 
programs 
 
34 
  
Ban yard waste from being disposed in landfills 23 
  
Implement a deposit/refund system for beverage containers 9 
  
Provide tax credits for new recycling facilities 29 
  
Provide low-interest loans for new recycling facilities 15 
  
Require all state government offices to purchase recycled 
materials 
 
29 
  
  
Source: Glenn (1998). 
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TABLE 3: EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF UNIT-PRICING 
 
 
Study 
 
Data 
 
Model 
Change in 
Garbage  
Change in 
Recycling 
Wertz 
(1976) 
Compares subscription 
program in San Francisco 
with flat fees imposed by 
“all urban areas” 
Comparison 
of Means  
ε = -0.15  
Jenkins 
(1993) 
Panel of 14 cities (10 
with user fees) over 
1980-88  
 ε = -0.12  
Hong et al. 
(1993) 
1990 survey of 4,306 
households in and around 
Portland, Oregon.  
Ordered 
Probit and 
2SLS 
No 
significant 
impact 
Unspecifie
d positive 
relationship 
Reschovsky 
and Stone 
(1994) 
1992 mail survey of 
1,422 households in and 
around Ithaca, NY. 
Probit  No 
significant 
impact 
Miranda et 
al. (1994) 
Panel of 21 cities over 18 
months beginning in 
1990 
Comparison 
of Means 
17%-74% 
reduction 
in garbage 
Average 
increase of 
128% 
Callan and 
Thomas 
(1997) 
1994 cross-section of 324 
towns in MA, 55 with 
unit-pricing programs 
 
OLS 
 6.6%- 
12.1% 
increase 
Fullerton 
and 
Kinnaman 
(1996) 
Two-period panel of 75 
households in 1992 
OLS ε = -0.076 
(weight) 
ε = -0.226 
(volume) 
Cross-price 
elasticity is  
0.073 
 
Podolsky 
and Spiegel 
(1998) 
1992 cross-section of 159 
municipalities in NJ, 12 
with unit-pricing  
OLS ε = -0.39  
Kinnaman 
and 
Fullerton 
(1997) 
1991 cross-section of 959 
towns across the U. S., 
114 with unit-pricing 
OLS 
 
2SLS 
ε = -0.19 
 
ε = -0.28 
ε = 0.23 
 
ε = 0.22 
Strathman et 
al. (1995) 
Seven year (1984-1991) 
time series in Portland, 
OR 
OLS ε = -0.11  
Seguino et 
al. (1995) 
1993-1994 cross section 
of 60 towns in Maine, 29 
with unit-pricing 
Comparison 
of  Means 
56% 
decrease 
 
 
ε = price elasticity of demand, OLS = ordinary least squares, 2SLS = two stage least 
squares.
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